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COMMENTS
Much is to be said in favor of the "imposter rule." In a proper
case for its application there are really two frauds perpetrated.
The first one is on the drawer to induce him to draw the check
and the second is on the bank to induce it to cash the check. If
the drawer and the cashing bank are equally innocent, then the
rule, that as between two innocent parties, the one by whose act
(drawing the check) the loss is made possible, should be the one
who is forced to bear it, should apply. In such a situation if the
drawer is negligent in ascertaining the true identity of the per-
son with whom he is dealing, or if the cashing bank is negligent
in failing to require proper identification upon cashing the check,
then the result should be varied. In the usual case the imposter
will work the fraud as to his identity on the cashing bank in the
same manner in which he worked the fraud on the government,
as for example, with the use of a stolen adjusted service certifi-
cate or by a notary public. In addition, the policy of the law in
the commercial field is to make these instruments freely negoti-
able. This policy assumes even greater importance because of the
increased number of government checks in circulation today.
The "imposter rule" is manifestly just and should become the
uniform rule in the Federal Courts. It is submitted that the re-
sult reached by the court in the instant case is eminently sound.
HAROLD B. BAMBURG*
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MUNICIPAL UNDERGROUND AUTOMO-
BILE PARKING FACILITIES-COMPENSATION TO ADJACENT PROP-
ERTY OwNERS.--The plaintiff was the owner of property abutting
Washington Avenue on which was operated a parking lot in
downtown Detroit. In 1947 the plaintiff filed a bill in chancery to
enjoin the defendant, the City of Detroit, from constructing an
auto parking garage under the street surface of Washington
Avenue adjoining her property. It was the plaintiff's contention
that she was being deprived of property without due process of
law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and Article Two, Section Nine of the Michi-
This rule is applied almost universally in cases of face-to-face dealings,
but where a written order is mailed to the seller, the majority of the courts
seem to hold that no title passes to the fraudulent buyer.
* Attorney-at-Law, Sedalia, Mo.; former member of the staff, WASH.
U. L. Q.
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gan Constitution. The plaintiff further contended that such a
municipal garage was a non-governmental function and uncon-
stitutional for that reason also.
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the trial court and dis-
missed the bill. The court pointed out that it is a well settled rule
that the streets of a city may be used for any purpose which is a
necessary public one and that the abutting land owners are not
entitled to new compensation. It was held to be immaterial
whether the city owned the street in fee or had an easement for
highway purposes, as in either case the rights of the land owner
would be the same. The court rejected without comment the con-
tention that a public garage was a non-governmental function.1
The subject of the instant case raises several questions in the
field of public law in relation to correcting the inadequate park-
ing facilities that exist in the larger cities. While the construc-
tion of an underground garage below a public street may seem to
be a far cry from the courthouse hitching post, in reality it is
only a logical development in the state's power to regulate the
use of its streets and highways.
Within the limits permitted by law, a municipality, in the
exercise of its police power, may enact regulations designed to
protect and promote public peace, health, morals, safety, welfare
and property.2 It is from this broad and almost limitless power
that the development of city parking has stemmed, and this is
the basis upon which the principal case rests. While parking an
automobile on a public street for a reasonable time without in-
terfering with traffic or police regulations is a reasonable use of
the highway, the primary right of the driver of an automobile
for the purpose of travel does not carry with it the right to store
his vehicle in the streets. The use of the streets for the purpose
of parking is a privilege and not a right and the privileg is sub-
ject to reasonable regulations under the police power. 3 It was
early established during the growth of the automotive age that
the length of time for parking may be regulated as long as it
is reasonable and not discriminatory.4 The next step in the de-
velopment of parking regulations was the sustaining of ordi-
nances providing for the installation of parking meters as a valid
1. Cleveland v. City of Detroit, 324 Mich. 527, 37 N.W.2d 625 (1949).
2. 62 C. J. S., MuN. CORP. § 147.
3. 60 C. J. S., MOTOR VEHICLSS § 28.
4. Allen & Reed Inc. v. Presby, 50 R.I. 53, 144 Atl. 188 (1929).
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exercise of the policeF power.- However, even with the street
regulations as to the length of time allowed for parking individ-
ual vehicles, the problems of adequate parking facilities still
plagued the larger municipalities and the doctrine was extended
still further to cope with what the courts came to recognized as
a public nuisance.6 The solution advanced was the integration
of regulated curb parking with the provision for aff-street park-
ing to free the streets of dangerous and often intolerable condi-
tions of traffic congestion. Legislation of this nature has in
general been upheld by the courts as evidenced by the fact that
by 1945 twenty-two states and the District of Columbia had en-
acted laws dealing with parking facilities and in 1946 alone, 65
cities opened new parking lots. In three instances at least the
form of off-street parking has been the maintenance of public
garages., In only one of these instances has a city been denied
the right to maintain a public garage,3 but this holding by
the Ohio court is not inconsistent with the doctrine here de-
veloped, for in the Ohio case the primary purpose for the opera-
tion of the garage was to raise revenue rather than to abate a
public evil. The Ohio court in wording its injunction recognized
this distinction. Therefore, it is submitted that the upholding
of the proposed construction of a garage in the City of Detroit
in the principal case is well within a doctrine already established
by the courts of other states.
Granted, then, that a city may condemn land and expend tax
monies for the construction and operation of a public garage to
abate a public nuisance, does it follow that a public garage is of
such a nature that it can be classified as a highway use so that
land already dedicated to highway purposes can be used for a
garage without further compensation to the abutting owner? In
the principal case the Michigan Court answered this question in
the affirmative.
5. See note 3 supra.
6. Lowell v. Boston, 322 Mass. 709, 79 N.E.2d. 713 (1948); Whittier v.
Dixon, 24 Cal.2d. 659, 151 P.2d. 5 (1944); McDouGAL and HABER, PROP-
ERTY, WEALTH, LAND: ALLOCATION, PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT 896(1948).
7. McSorley v. Fitzgerald, 359 Pa. 264, 59 A.2d. 142 (1948); Parr v.
Ladd, 323 Mich. 592, 36 N.W.2d. 157 (1948).
8. San Francisco v. Linareo, 10 Cal.2d. 441, 106 P.2d. 369 (1940);
Lowell v. Boston, 322 Mass. 709, 79 N.E.2d. 713 (1948); Cleveland v.
Ruple, 130 Ohio St. 465, 200 N.E. 507 (1936).
9. Cleveland v. Ruple, supra note 8.
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It is an elementar proposition given force in all of the states
that the land used for public streets and highways in the United
States is acquired either by condemnation, dedication, or pre-
scription for highway purposes. However, while the courts have
been and are in accord on the mode of acquisition of highway
easements 0 there is not that same uniformity as to the extent of
those highway easements. Generally speaking the courts have
taken two distinct views in determining this problem.
The stricter and probably more logical view is that an appro-
priation of the highway for a new and distinct purpose, foreign
from its orginal object, entitles the prior owner to additional
compensation. The reasoning seems to be that any use not con-
templated at the time of the original taking or dedication con-
stitutes an additional servitude and thus the prior owner is
entitled to the additional compensation."
The second view is that when land is taken or dedicated for
use as a highway, it should be presumed to be taken not merely
for such purposes and usage as was known at the time of taking,
but also for all public purposes present and future, then known
or unkown, consistent with the character of such highways and
not detrimental to abutting land owners.' 2 Under this view the
test of a ne wuse as to whether or not it requires compensation is
not to be found in the nature of the structure or vehicle, but
rather the test becomes the purpose and result of the means
employed. If the purpose is not inconsistent or incompatible with
the use of the highway and the proposed use is a public one it is
a proper highway use.'3 It is immediately apparent that this is
a much broader and more workable doctrine, and while courts
may differ as to whether a proposed use is consistent or incon-
sistent with the use and purpose of a highway, it allows a rela-
tively unfettered approach to the solution of existing and future
municipal problems, such as inadequate parking facilities.
The majority of the states have adopted the second and more
10. In very few instances, if any, does the state or municipality have
a fee simple estate in such land and when the courts speak of fee owner-
ship it would seem that they refer to a fee in the easement for highway
purposes rather than of a true unqualified fee estate.
11. Craig v. Rochester City & Brighton R.R., 39 N.Y. 404 (1868).
12. Dakota Central Tel. Co. v. Sprink County Power Co., 42 S.D. 448,
176 N.W. 143 (1920).
13. McWilliams v. Little River Drainage Dist., 369 Mo. 444, 190 S.W.
897 (1916); York v. Walla Walla County, 28 Wash.2d. 891, 184 P.2d. 577(1947).
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liberal view, taking the position that the early common law
conception of the extent of a public easement for highway pur-
poses has grown with the times and the public necessity and now
includes not only the use of the surface but the use of as much
of the land underneath and of the space above as is required for
street purposes." The courts supporting this doctrine acknowl-
edge that the primary use of the street is the unrestricted pas-
sage of the public but furter maintain there are many incidental
and collateral uses. Thus under this doctrine the use of the
streets for sewers' 5 water pipes' 6 and gas pipes 17 has been sus-
tained where it is for the benefit of the community. In some
states telephone and telegraph lines have been held to be a proper
highway use," while in others this has been denied and regarded
as an additional servitude with an additional compensation re-
quired. 19 In general, passenger street railways operated on the
surface have been held to fall within the highway function.20
Likewise in Massachusetts 2 subways have been held to be
within the purpose of streets and in Illinois elevated railways
have been held not to constitute additional burdens on the ease-
ment.2
2
The stricter view has been adopted almost solely by New York.
This accounts for the consistent stand taken by the New York
courts in holding that railways, 2 subways24 and elevated rail-
ways, 2 are additional burdens on the highway easement. How-
ever, it does not account for the inconsistency of the courts of
14. Graves v. Shattuck, 35 N.H. 257 (1857); Yale U. v. New Haven,
104 Conn. 610, 134 Atl. 268 (1926).
15. Cone v. Hartford, 28 Conn. 363 (1859).
16. Provost v. New Chester Water Co., 162 Pa. St. 275, 29 Atl. 914
(1894).
17. Cheney v. Barker, 198 Mass. 356, 84 N.E. 492 (1908).
18. Pierce v. Drew, 136 Mass. 75 (1883); Julia Bldg. Ass'n v. Bell Tel.
Co., 88 Mo. 258 (1885); Carpenter v. Lancaster, 250 Pa. 541, 95 Atl. 702(1915).
19. Pacific Postal Tel. & Cable Co. v. Irvine, 49 Fed. 113 (C.C.S.D.
Cal. 1892); Eels v. Am. Tel. & Telegraph Co., 143 N.Y. 133, 38 N.E. 202(1894) ; De Kalb County Tel. Co. v. Dutton, 228 Ill. 178, 81 N.E. 838 (1907).
20. Elliott v. Fair Haven & W.R.R., 32 Conn. 579 (1860); Finch v.
Riverside & A. Ry., 87 Cal. 597, 25 Pac. 765 (1891); Chicago, B. & Q.
R.R. v. W. Chicago Street R.R., 156 Ill. 255, 40 N.E. 1008 (1895).
21. Sears v. Crocker, 184 Mass. 587, 69 N.E. 327 (1904).
22. Doane v. Lake Street Elev. R.R., 165 Ill. 510, 46 N.E. 520 (1896);
Strong v. Northwestern Elev. R.R., 166 Ill. 207, 46 N.E. 1153 (1897).
23. Craig v. Rochester City & Brighton R.R., 39 N.Y. 404 (1868).
24. In Re Opening of New Street, 215 N.Y. 109, 109 N.E. 104 (1915).
25. Re Gilbert Elev. Ry., 38 Hun. 438 (N.Y. 1886).
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that state in saying that the public has a so-called greater ease-
ment in urban areas and on this basis holding that sewers, water
mains, gas pipes and telegraph lines are proper highway pur-
poses in urban communities while denying them to the rural
areas without additional compensation on the basis that such
uses were not contemplated by the parties.26
Therefore while under the stricter rule, it is extremely doubt-
ful whether an underground garage such as was here involved
could be built without first compensating the adjoining land-
owners, under the more liberal view, as adopted by the majority
of the states, such a garage would be entirely consistent with the
purpose and use of the streets. True, the means chosen by the
City of Detroit is new, and perhaps even novel, but that is not
the criterion. In relieving traffic congestion a public garage is
directly facilitating public passage and this is much more nearly
akin to the primary purpose than the installation of sewers or
water mains which have from the beginning been held to be
incidental to the purpose of a public way. It is submitted there-
fore that the position taken by the Michigan Supreme Court is
well taken and will probably be followed by other courts in the
future when they are concerned with the same question.
It should be noted that this decision is not only important in
that it supplies a solution to a dangerous and costly municipal
problem,27 but it also supplies a solution which in many instances
in the larger urban areas will be less likely to strain the already
over-taxed budgets of the municipal governments in that the
primary restraint on the providing of adequate parking facilities
in the congested districts of our cities today is the almost pro-
hibitive cost of acquiring the land for the facilities. That the
facilities must be provided is unquestioned, for without them the
cities must either decentralize or lose their importance as com-
munity trading and business focal centers.
A. RODNEY WEISS
26. See Bloomfield & R. Nat. Gas Light Co. v. Calkins, 62 N.Y. 386(1875); Brunt v. Town of Flatbush, 128 N.Y. 50, 27 N.E. 973 (1891).
27. It has been estimated that the cost of traffic congestion in Man-
hattan is $500,000 per day. See 3 REGIONAL SURVEY or N. Y. AND ITS
ENVIMNS 60 (1927).
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